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This is chapter 4 of Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 
Diversity (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2015). In this chapter I investigate the 
quota-based approach to achieving gender balance in corporate boardrooms. Quotas and 
related target-based measures for publicly traded firms are currently in place in a number of 
countries, including Iceland, Belgium, France, Italy, and Norway and are at different stages 
of consideration in other jurisdictions, including Canada, the European Union, and Germany. 
I present findings from my qualitative, interview-based study of Norwegian corporate 
directors in order to provide empirical elucidation of how quota-based regimes operate in 
practice. The identity narratives of Norwegian board members offer particularly rich sources 
of insight, given that Norway was the first jurisdiction to pursue the quota path and thus has 
the most mature quota regime. While highly contentious when adopted, the Norwegian 
quota project unquestionably set the stage for subsequent legislative developments in other 
countries. 
I delve into the lived experiences of Norwegian directors who gained appointments as a 
result of Norway’s quota law, as well as those who held appointments before the law was 
enacted.  Several questions frame my investigation. How have these individuals subjectively 
experienced, and made sense of, this intrusive form of regulation?  How does legally 
required gender diversity affect their economic and institutional lives?  And how has it 
shaped boardroom cultural dynamics and decision making, as well as the overall governance 
fabric of the board? 
The forced repopulation of boards along gender lines has disturbed the traditional order of 
corporate governance systems, dislocating established hierarchies of power in key market-
based institutions. Norway represents the paradigmatic case of this disturbance and has set 
in motion a wave of corporate governance reform unlike any other. As such, it constitutes a 
fascinating and appropriate case study through which to consider the implications of quota 
regimes. 
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NORWAY’S SOCIO-LEGAL JOURNEY: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF BOARDROOM DIVERSITY QUOTAS 
  
Introduction  
In this chapter I present findings from my qualitative study of Norwegian corporate directors in 
order to provide some empirical elucidation of how quota-based regimes operate in practice. As I 
explain in more detail below, I interviewed male and female directors with a view to understanding their 
lived experiences both before and after the quota law came into effect. In the pages that follow, I 
explore in detail the rich set of responses elicited from my interviews. Some of my salient findings 
include: 
 The societal acceptance of Norway’s quota law has been to some degree a function of Norway’s 
political culture and commitment to egalitarianism. 
  
 Over time, support for the quota law amongst directors it affects has increased. Directors’ views 
changed after they witnessed the law in action, experienced its effects, and came to the 
realization that change in the boardroom would require legal intervention, given the dynamics 
of in-group favoritism and closed social networks that thwart diversity. 
 
 The dominant narrative my interviewees conveyed was that quota-induced gender diversity has 
positively affected boardroom work and firm governance. Generally, respondents emphasized 
the range of perspectives and experiences that women bring to the board, as well as the value 
of women’s independence and outsider status. They also stressed women’s greater propensity 
to engage in more rigorous deliberations, risk assessment, and monitoring. 
 
 Most directors provided concrete examples of how, in their view, diversity had made a 
difference to Norwegian firms. These examples included a range of outcomes, from helping 
boards make difficult decisions (such as firing the CEO and handling crises), to having an impact 
in more functional areas (such as redesigning product marketing strategies). 
 
 The presence of a critical mass of women matters to the achievement of diversity-related 
outcomes. And, in part because of the critical mass the quota law requires, women overall 
reported that they did not feel stigmatized. Though their stories are complex, the majority 
characterized the quota as a positive mechanism, one that facilitated their entry to the upper 
echelons of the corporation.   
 
  Together my findings suggest a case for a modified business rationale. Women’s presence on 
the board, at a critical mass, can enhance boardroom decision making and the board’s overall 
governance culture. These positive effects were achieved as a result of the quota law, which has also 
democratized access to a space previously unavailable to women. On these fronts, I judge the quota law 
a success to date. That said, the lived reality of the law also raises a number of difficult questions and 
unresolved issues regarding the value of board diversity and how best to achieve it. I explore my 
conclusions, and these complexities, in more detail in chapter 5. Here, I focus instead on the particular 
experiences of directors that I uncover in my study.  
  In general, little is known about the operation of quota regimes around the world. In recent 
political science work on the spread of gender quotas in political life, scholars note the existing 
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speculation on the likely impact of these measures. Advocates and detractors each opine that the 
mandates will alter the effectiveness and dynamics of political parties and institutions in some way—
whether for better or worse. The speculation remains largely uncorroborated, however, and our 
knowledge is incomplete at best.1  
  We know even less about quotas in the corporate context, given that these laws have been 
enacted more recently. The study I present in this chapter seeks to remedy that gap. There are many 
unresolved questions in the debate over quotas as an ameliorative remedy. Given the range of socio-
political contexts in which quotas have been implemented, and the diversity of individual experiences 
and organizational cultures within these contexts, it may be impossible to reach definitive or universal 
conclusions about quotas’ effects. But we can at least deepen our understanding through empirical 
investigation of the quota experiences already initiated, so that analysis, rather than conjecture, informs 
the debate. 
  In this part of my study, I move past the numerical impact quotas have had on corporate boards 
to probe more deeply into their actual meaning and effects. Using a qualitative methodology, with a 
phenomenological lens,2 I seek to replace speculation with an account of real-life boardroom reality. 
Returning to the themes laid out in chapter 1, I am interested in exploring corporate governance’s 
human elements3 and am particularly interested in illuminating law’s role in transforming the board’s 
“decision-making culture.”4 Before doing so, I place the Norwegian quota law in socio-political context 
and briefly explain the design of my research.5  
Norway’s quota law in context  
The Nordic corporate governance structure “lies between” the unitary (Anglo-Saxon) and dual 
(continental European) systems6 and has been characterized as a “one and a half-string system.”7 
Norwegian corporate law specifies that the board of directors has both management8 and supervisory 
functions.9 Daily management responsibilities are statutorily assigned to a “general manager”— in other 
                                                          
1
 Mona Lena Krook & Pär Zetterberg, “Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives” 
(2014) 35:1 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 3 at 4. 
2
 See generally Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, Cal: SAGE, 1994). 
3
 Morten Huse, Boards, Governance and Value Creation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 209. 
4
 Ibid at 208. 
5
 For a review of previous studies on the Norwegian quota law’s effects on corporate governance, see Morten 
Huse, “The ‘Golden Skirts’: Lessons from Norway about Women on Corporate Boards of Directors” in Stefan 
Gröschl & Junko Takagi, eds, Diversity Quotas, Diverse Perspectives: The Case of Gender (Farnham, England: Gower, 
2012) 11 at 15-16 (characterized by the author as “few”). 
6
 Beate Sjåfjell & Cecilie Kjelland, “Norway: Corporate Governance on the Outskirts of the EU” in Andreas M 
Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt, eds, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 702 at 713-14. See also Danish Corporate Governance Committee et al, 
“Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries” (April 2009) at 8, online: Iceland Chamber of Commerce 
<www.vi.is/files/Nordic%20CG%20-%20web_1472238902.pdf>.  
7
 Inger Marie Hagen, “Employee-Elected Directors on Company Boards: Stakeholder Representatives or the Voice 
of Labour" in Roger Blanpain et al, eds, Rethinking Corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder 
Value (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 2011) 121 at 128. 
8
 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, Del K:1, no 45 of 13 June 1997, s 6-12(1) [translated by the law 
firm Schjødt] [Norway] (“The management of the company pertains to the board of directors. The board of 
directors shall ensure a proper organization of the business of the company.”).  
9
 Ibid, s 6-13(1) (“The board of directors shall supervise the day-to-day management and the company’s business in 
general.”). 
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words, a CEO—who must abide by the board’s directions.10 The general manager typically appoints the 
remainder of the high-level management team.11  
Companies with two hundred or more employees must have an additional supervisory body 
called a corporate assembly,12 unless the firm and the majority of its employees consent to omitting it.13 
The corporate assembly must have twelve or more members.14 It is this optional corporate assembly 
that comprises the “one-half” element of Norway’s board structure; its tasks include electing the 
board’s chair and its directors15 and supervising the CEO and the board,16 which, as noted, itself also has 
both supervisory and management duties.   
The current iteration of the Norwegian quota law (described in chapter 3) has a rather 
complicated and technical past. Norway’s formal legislative journey began with measures passed in 
2003, which applied a quota to state-owned and municipal companies and to companies incorporated 
by special legislation.17 Soon after, Norway took steps to extend these measures to public limited 
liability companies, known in Norway as allmennaksjeselskap or “ASA” firms. Private limited liability 
companies, known as aksjeselskap, or “AS” firms, do not fall under the quota regime’s umbrella.  
The law vis-à-vis ASA firms evolved in three phases. Prior to January 1, 2004, Norwegian public 
companies were not subject to any form of quota-based regulation. In phase 1 (January 1, 2004–
December 31, 2005), under a government-industry agreement, compliance with the quota law was 
voluntary. During this period, the government gave firms the opportunity to address gender imbalances 
within their governance structures without formal state intervention. However, a Statistics Norway 
study revealed that by the prescribed deadline during phase 1 (July 1, 2005), only 68 of 519 (13.1 
percent) of ASA companies had reached the intended levels of representation. By that date, 
approximately 16 percent of directors were female, much lower than the government’s expectation.18  
                                                          
10
 Ibid, s 6-14(1) (“The general manager is in charge of the day-to-day management of the company’s business and 
shall comply with the guidelines and instructions issued by the board of directors.”). 
11
 Sjåfjell & Kjelland, supra note 6 at 714. 
12
 Norway, supra note 8, s 6-35(1). Subsection 6-40(1) provides that companies’ articles of association can establish 
an assembly even if not required under the statute. 
13
 Ibid, s 6-35(2). Additionally, companies in the financial, shipping, media, and extractive sectors are not subject to 
this requirement. See Øyvind Bøhren & R Øystein Strøm, “The Value-Creating Board: Theory and Evidence” (2005) 




 Norway, supra note 8, s 6-35(1). If the assembly has more than twelve members, the total number of members 
must be divisible by three. Two-thirds of the assembly is elected by the general shareholders’ meeting and the 
remaining one-third by the employees from amongst themselves. See subsections 6-35(1), (3), and (4), 
respectively. 
15
 Ibid, s 6-37(1). 
16
 Ibid, s 6-37(2). 
17
 Act of 19 December 2003 No 120, Part XII, para 1; Norway, Royal Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, “Follow-
up to the Package Meeting of 9 to 10 November 2005 Regarding Representation of Both Sexes on Company 




 Norwegian Mission to the EU, “Norway’s Mixed Gender Boardrooms” (8 June 2009), online: <http://www.eu-
norway.org/news/gender_rep_boardrooms/>. 
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In response, the Norwegian government made quotas compulsory beginning on January 1, 2006. 
In phase 2, from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007, all existing ASA firms were provided a two-year 
transitional period to reach the representation levels the quota law required or face potential 
dissolution. All newly incorporated firms, however, had to demonstrate immediate compliance with the 
quota. Finally, since January 1, 2008, all firms have been required to comply with the quota (phase 3). 
Notably, all corporations have achieved conformity.19 
Others have canvassed the details of the quota law’s political advancement and the ensuing 
public deliberations.20 At a general level though, the seeds of the law were initially planted in 1999, 
during discussions pertaining to the reform of Norway’s gender equality legislation.21 During the 
consultative process, the location of the proposed quota shifted from the Gender Equality Act to 
Norway’s corporate law.22 Interestingly, while the rationale of gender egalitarianism was certainly 
present in the political discourse surrounding the law, it appears that the primary discourse centered on 
firm competitiveness.23 Considerable credit has been given to the leadership of Ansgar Gabrielsen, the 
former minister of trade and industry of Norway’s center-right Conservative Party, particularly in the 
final chapter of the quota’s legislative journey.24 According to the story, Gabrielsen telephoned a 
reporter with the country’s most-read news outlet and requested a meeting. During the interview, 
which occurred immediately prior to the coalition government’s closing debate on the quota law, 
Gabrielsen revealed his abhorrence for the influence and control that men exercised in Norwegian 
corporate culture. Apparently, Gabrielsen elected not to confer with any political colleagues prior to the 
interview. His comments marked a turning point, effectively muting the Party members who were most 
opposed to the law.25 In the interviews I conducted with Norwegian directors, a number of participants 
stressed the importance of this moment, one characterizing it as a bold “coup”:  
[H]e knew he would get heavy hits, because that’s the most unusual thing to do as a 
minister . . . at least [as] the minister of trade in a conservative coalition. . . . And him 
being a right-wing conservative. But that’s how it all started. . . . [A]nd then the battle 
began, but . . . the whole government had to stand behind him! . . . That’s the most 
amazing story you will ever hear. And it needs to go into your book (laughing).26 
                                                          
19
 Anne Kjølseth Ekerholt & Carmen Di Marino, “Norway” in Paul Hastings LLP, “Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Women 
in the Boardroom”, 3d ed (2013), 94 at 96, online:  
<http://www.paulhastings.com/genderparity/pdf/Gender_Parity_Report.pdf>.  
20
 See e.g. Mari Teigen, “Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway: Innovative Gender Equality Policy” in 
Colette Fagan, Maria C González Menéndez & Silvia Gómez Ansón, eds, Women on Corporate Boards and in Top 
Management: European Trends and Policy (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 70 at 78-82. 
21
 Ibid at 78. 
22
 Ibid at 78-79. 
23
 Hilde Bjørkhaug & Siri Øyslebø Sørensen, “Feminism without Gender? Arguments for Gender Quotas on 
Corporate Boards in Norway” in Fredrik Engelstad & Mari Teigen, eds, Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas: 
Comparative Perspectives, vol 29 (Bingley, UK: Emerald, Comparative Social Research, 2012) 185 at 198-99. 
24
 Teigen, supra note 20 at 79. 
25
 Ibid; Morten Huse, “The Political Process Behind the Gender Balance Law” in Silke Machold et al, eds, Getting 
Women on to Corporate Boards: A Snowball Starting in Norway (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) 9 at 11-12. 
26
 Interviewee 8, Transcript, at 14-15. 
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Gabrielsen’s own reflections underscore the salience of his chosen course of action: “If I had told them 
before, the initiative would have been killed by one committee after another. . . . I had to employ 
terrorist tactics. Sometimes you have to create an earthquake, a tsunami, to get things to change.”27  
Research design 
A. Access and trust  
 As discussed in chapter 1, in order to understand quota-based corporate governance regulation, 
it is necessary to explore the lived realities of the board members it directly affects. How have they 
experienced this interventionist form of regulation? How does legally required gender diversity affect 
their economic and institutional lives? Conducting this exploration, however, is very challenging. Boards 
of directors are often small, socially similar, and closely bonded units.28 They are elite decision-making 
entities that engage with highly sensitive topics.29 Their members lead busy professional lives. It is not 
surprising, then, that boards are notoriously difficult for outsiders to access for academic investigation30 
and have been analogized to “black boxes”31 and “fortresses.”32 Directors may be hesitant to offer their 
rare spare minutes and insights to those who have not established a preexisting relationship of trust—
especially with regard to delicate issues such as diversity.33  
Mindful of these difficulties, I employed a range of strategies to develop a sample population of 
Norwegian directors whom I could interview. Relying on professional contacts, I first established a small 
initial set of interview participants. I then utilized a referral technique known as snowball sampling to 
identify additional interviewees. After conducting each initial interview, I asked the participant if she or 
he would be willing to identify or reach out to a director colleague who might be interested in speaking 
with me. This nonprobability sampling method is especially helpful in studies where it is challenging to 
access population members,34 such as sex workers, gang members, the homeless,35 and professional 
elites such as high-ranking members of government and executives of private institutions.36 Researchers 
studying corporate board diversity have used it to great effect.37 I provide additional detail on the 
strategies I used in the appendix.  
 
                                                          
27
 Christine Toomey, “Quotas for Women on the Board: Do They Work?”, The Sunday Times (8 June 2008), online: 
<http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/style/article96924.ece>. 
28
 Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, “The Social Nature of Boards” (2005) 70:4 Brook L Rev 1259 at 1266.  
29
 Richard Leblanc & Mark S Schwartz, “The Black Box of Board Process: Gaining Access to a Difficult Subject” 
(2007) 15:5 Corp Governance: Int’l Rev 843 at 847, 850. 
30
 Ibid at 846. 
31
 David SR Leighton & Donald H Thain, Making Boards Work: What Directors Must Do To Make Canadian Boards 
Effective (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997) at xv; Catherine M Daily, Dan R Dalton & Albert A Cannella, Jr, 
“Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data” (2003) 28:3 Academy Mgmt Rev 371 at 379.  
32
 Ibid at 378. 
33
 Lissa L Broome, John M Conley & Kimberly D Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board 
Diversity” (2011) 89:3 NCL Rev 759 at 769 [Broome, Conley & Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories”]. 
34
 Colin Robson, Real World Research, 3d ed (Padstow, Great Britain: John Wiley, 2011) at 274-76. 
35
 Russell K Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research, 7th ed (Thousand Oaks, 
Cal: SAGE, 2012) at 158. 
36
 Robert Mikecz, “Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues” (2012) 18:6 Qualitative Inquiry 482 at 
491. 
37
 See e.g. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories”, supra note 33 at 768-69. 
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B. Profile of the sample population  
My final sample consisted of twenty-three in-depth, semi-structured interviews with directors of 
Norwegian corporate boards.38 Of the participants, twenty-one were Norwegian, one was Swedish, and 
one was a non-Scandinavian citizen who had been resident in Norway for many years. All interviewees 
had direct or indirect experience with Norway’s corporate “quotations”—what North Americans would 
refer to as “quotas.”39 The vast majority (95.6 percent) had first-hand experience with the quota: at the 
time of the interview, twenty-two directors were either sitting members of ASA company boards subject 
to the mandatory law (“quota boards”) or had previously sat on a quota board. One director did not 
have past or present experience sitting on a quota board, but explained that the law nonetheless 
influenced some of her nonquota (private company) appointments, in the sense that she believed she 
obtained the positions as an indirect result of the law. Overall, the sample includes directors who held 
appointments during each of the developmental phases discussed above. Nine respondents (39.1 
percent) sat on ASA boards prior to the beginning of the quota law period. The breadth of experience in 
my sample therefore provided me not only with rich data regarding the current regulatory climate, but 
also with valuable points of comparison between this climate and the period prior to the law’s 
enactment. Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of the respondents’ overall board experience during each 
phase, disaggregated by gender. Table 4.2, also disaggregated by gender, provides information on when 
participants received their first ASA appointment.  
Table 4.1 – Sample’s overall ASA board experience by quota phase  
 Prequota: 
Experience with 
ASA board(s) prior 
to quota law (pre-
January 1, 2004) 
Phase 1:  




December 31, 2005) 
Phase 2:  
Experience with ASA 
board(s) during 
transitional period  
(January 1, 2006–
December 31, 2007) 
Phase 3:  
Experience with ASA 
board(s) during 
mandatory period  
(January 1, 2008–date 
of interview) 
Female 4  6 13 15 
Male 5 5 6 7 
Aggregate        9 (39.1%)         11 (47.8%)        19 (82.6%)         22 (95.7%) 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Sample’s first ASA board appointment by quota phase  
 Prequota: 
First appointed to 
ASA board(s) prior 
to quota law (pre-
January 1, 2004) 
Phase 1:  




December 31, 2005) 
Phase 2:  
First appointed to ASA 
board(s) during 
transitional period  
(January 1, 2006–
December 31, 2007) 
Phase 3:  
First appointed to ASA 
board(s) during 
mandatory period  
(January 1, 2008–date 
of interview) 
Female 4 3 6 2 
Male 5 1 0 2 
Aggregate        9 (39.1%)        4 (17.4%)        6 (26.1%)        4 (17.4%) 
                                                          
38
 Ruth Sealy, “Changing Perceptions of Meritocracy in Senior Women’s Careers” (2010) 25:3 Gender Mgmt: Int’l J 
184. 
39
 Kate Sweetman, “Norway’s Boards: Two Years Later, What Difference Do Women Make?”, Fast Company (13 
July 2009), online: <www.fastcompany.com/1308538/norway%E2%80%99s-boards-two-years-later-what-
difference-do-women-make>. 
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  The sample reported approximately ninety-five quota board appointments in total (current and 
prior), at more than seventy respective corporations.40 These figures reflect the fact that some 
respondents served on the same boards and some held multiple directorships. Their positions were in a 
wide range of commercial industries, including: finance and insurance; resource extraction; property 
and real estate; shipping; agriculture; technology; automotive; media and communications; education; 
healthcare; human resources; hospitality; pulp and paper; and retail. The sample possesses board 
experience on small, medium, and large capitalization corporations. Some of Norway’s most prominent 
companies are represented, including firms listed in the Forbes Global 2000. My sample also had varied 
levels of professional experience: The most senior director’s public company board service spanned 
twenty years, while the most junior director had sat on such boards for two years. The majority of 
interviewees (fifteen, or 65.2 percent) had either CEO or senior management experience, though a 
significant minority (eight, or 34.8 percent) did not. In addition to their corporate governance 
experience, the respondents brought a wealth of professional backgrounds to the boardroom, including: 
investment banking; consulting; law; line management in a range of industries; communications; 
engineering; politics; private equity; and financial analysis.  
Fifteen interviewees (65.2 percent) were women and eight (34.8 percent) were men. All were 
White and ranged in age from thirty-eight to seventy-two years, the average age being fifty-two. The 
average age of the female interviewees was forty-nine and that of the men was fifty-eight. Table 4.3 
illustrates the age profile of the sample, disaggregated by gender. It was a very well-educated group in 
terms of the highest degrees attained. Fifteen (65.2 percent) reported having earned a graduate degree, 
such a Masters of Business Administration or its equivalent, another graduate-level business degree, a 
Master of Laws, or a Masters in another field such as Arts, Science, Economics, and Engineering. Three 
interviewees (13 percent) graduated from law school, and four (17.4 percent) held bachelor’s degrees. 
Only one (4.3 percent) did not possess a university degree, though this respondent completed some 
university-level courses. The majority of interviewees (approximately 70 percent) reported having a 
spouse or partner and/or children.   
Table 4.3 – Profile of sample by age and gender  
 Female Male Aggregate  
Average Age 49.1 58.8 52.4 
Median Age 49 57.5 50 
Minimum Age 38 49 38 
Maximum Age 61 72 72 
 
C. Data collection, analysis, and limitations 
I approached each meeting with a flexible interview guide that set out particular questions and 
key themes.41 I first asked respondents to discuss their individual and professional backgrounds. We 
then discussed the corporate governance practices and policies of the boards on which they have 
served; their experiences with, and views on, board diversity; and their experiences with, and views on, 
the Norwegian quota regime in particular. We focused considerably on diversification’s effect, if any, on 
boardroom cultural dynamics, governance, and decision making, and on the lives of female directors. 
The conversations frequently took a direction of their own, as together we unearthed numerous 
                                                          
40
 This figure excludes one outlier director, who reported sitting on an inordinate number of boards due to 
structural issues associated with that director’s board positions. 
41
 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 3d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 442. 
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relevant issues. Mindful of the extensive conjecture regarding the effects of board diversity quotas, I 
strived to draw out the respondents’ narratives in a manner “that allowed them to express themselves 
in their own words and as ‘knowers’ of their own life stories.”42 I sought to “uncover, rather than 
presuppose” the interview participants’ subjective truths.43  
 In qualitative research, phenomenological investigations center on “the meaning for several 
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon.”44 As noted, my primary objective 
was to understand Norwegian directors’ lived experiences with the corporate quota law and the 
phenomenon of legally mandated gender balance, with a view towards informing current international 
policy debates. As such, a phenomenological lens was an ideal fit for the task at hand, and I used 
phenomenological research methods to analyze the narrative data. In the appendix, I discuss the data 
collection and analysis processes in more detail. 
 As Johnson observes, there is no consensus on the optimal number of interviewees for a 
qualitative study.45 Much depends on the questions under consideration and the investigator’s goals.46 
That said, Creswell notes the literature’s recommendation that phenomenological studies include “from 
5 to 25 individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon.”47 This study’s sample size (again, 
twenty-three) fits squarely within this suggestion. However, given the relatively small population, and 
the qualitative nature of the study, I do not suggest any statistically significant generalizations. This is by 
no means a comprehensive investigation of the experiences of Norwegian corporate directors, and the 
sample was not randomly selected—both are potential limitations.  
That said, my sample enables an expansive and richly textured account of governance diversity 
in Norwegian firms for several reasons: (1) its significant experience on different boards and at different 
levels of the governance hierarchy; (2) its experience with the quota law at all stages of its development; 
(3) its representation of a wide range of commercial industries and all levels of market capitalization; (4) 
its variance in age and experience levels; and (5) mindful of the self-described limitations of previous 
studies, its inclusion of both men and women,48 which provides perspectives from both sides of the 
gender coin.   
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A number of consistent patterns emerge from this exploratory, illustrative study. I discuss these 
patterns, along with the other central results of the investigation, in the section that follows. Overall, in 
these wide-ranging interviews, I canvassed a wealth of important topics relevant to the global board 
diversity conversation. I have chosen to focus here on two particular themes and corresponding 
research questions, which I referenced above and present more concretely in Table 4.4, below. These 
specific subjects, I believe, are especially helpful in illuminating the deeper complex meanings of the 
forced repopulation of boards along gendered lines. 
Table 4.4 – Themes and corresponding research questions 
Theme Research questions 
1. Reactions to the quota law 
 
What were the overall societal and director-specific 
reactions to the quota law?  
What cultural and socio-political factors informed these 
reactions?  
2. The quota law’s meaning and 
effects  
 
How has legally mandated gender balance affected 
boardroom cultural dynamics, decision making, and overall 
firm governance?  
Mindful of the discourse surrounding potential stigmatizing 
effects, how have women directors subjectively experienced 
the effects of the quota law? What has “invading” the space 
of corporate governance meant to them?  
 
A. Societal reactions to the quota law 
(i) General acceptance  
Participants reflected on the initial reaction of Norwegian society as a whole to the quota law’s 
implementation and on how particular subsets, such as businesspeople, politicians, and the media, 
responded as well. Many spoke of early resistance in the population at large, citing the commonly held 
view that the law would be unsuccessful in practice or would cause insurmountable compliance 
difficulties. Others noted that many in Norway were simply in a state of surprise or disbelief. A number 
of interviewees suggested that the reaction of male corporate directors tended to be particularly 
negative or skeptical. While an almost equal number felt that the male reaction was varied, and could 
not be generalized, most who expressed this view also felt that whether Norwegian men supported or 
opposed the law depended on whether, and to what extent, they perceived it as a threat to their own 
board positions and to traditional modes of governance.  
Nonetheless, despite a difficult adjustment period, the initial heated debate in Norway appears 
to have largely subsided.49 While in some countries the prospect of such aggressive intervention in 
corporate governance cultures is the subject of intense controversy, the reality of such intrusion in 
Norway appears to have been generally accepted. One participant remarked that with “every year that 
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passes, people get more used to [the quota law] and find it more and more natural.”50 Another 
compared the quota law’s normalization process to a previously enacted law banning smoking in all 
public places:   
[I]t’s like the ‘no-smoking’ law in Norway. We were [one of] the first to ban smoking in 
all public restaurants and the rest of the world thought we were [some] sort of crazy 
police state. But now, a lot of other countries have done the same! And in Norway it 
was so controversial, people were so angry, but after it was implemented, no one [has] 
regrets anymore.51 
While various dynamics likely account for this acceptance, almost three-quarters of respondents 
identified three particular socio-political factors as playing an integral role in rendering the law 
palatable. First, many interviewees felt that the two-year phase-in period allowed affected companies to 
adjust gradually to the coming mandate and to prepare both mentally and practically for the changes it 
would require. This gradualism served to reduce resistance and practical problems when the mandatory 
quota came into effect. One participant suggested that the voluntary period was less of a factor than the 
first-in-time quota for state-controlled firms. She suggested that the government’s willingness to apply 
the controversial measure to firms in which it was a major owner set an example for the rest of industry.  
Second, directors cited Norway’s political culture as an important determinant. Norway has a 
strong tradition of political party quotas, wherein parties voluntarily undertake to meet a specified level 
of gender representation amongst their contenders for public office.52 Beginning in 1975, Norway’s 
Socialist Left Party adopted a 40 percent party quota.53 Since that time, four other prominent parties 
have followed suit.54 Many of these respondents were of the view that these measures have normalized 
the use of positive discrimination in Norwegian society, thus making the corporate quota less 
controversial than it may have been otherwise. Some also opined that party quotas have led to 
Norwegians becoming accustomed to women in positions of power; it is not anomalous for women to 
hold such positions and to succeed in them, and they are respected for doing so. 
Third, directors in the sample ascribed the successful internalization of the quota law, and its 
overall effectiveness, to what one respondent referred to as the “philosophical underpinnings of the 
culture,”55 in other words, to particular threads of the overall Norwegian social fabric. Most frequently, 
participants cited Norway’s focus on egalitarianism and the presence of social democratic norms and 
traditions. They felt these values led to a readier acceptance of the quota law and of the idea of gender-
balanced boardrooms, and helped to ensure that a qualified pool of female directors existed. More 
concretely, some observed that Norway’s overall corporate culture tends to be open and 
nonhierarchical as well as encouraging of parental leave, flex policies, and work-from-home policies, and 
that Norwegian companies already deal with laws mandating employee representation on the board in 
certain circumstances (the codetermination system).56 Others noted that much of the female population 
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in Norway is well educated, which means that women are active participants in the labor market and are 
thus either qualified to serve as board directors or able to become qualified.  
Also on this front, some discussed the division of household labor and childcare, pointing out 
that government social benefit policies and general society norms tend to result in Norwegian men 
absorbing some portion of household or childcare responsibilities. Participants generally suggested that 
these policies and norms afford Norwegian women the necessary time and ability to develop their 
careers and to seek out board service. Recent data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“OECD”) supports interviewees’ observations about the division of labor. Of OECD 
member states, Norway ranks second—after Denmark—in terms of male time spent performing unpaid 
work, including housekeeping, caring for family members, and shopping.57 With respect to particular 
state-related measures, the government’s current paid parental leave policy requires that the father 
take a specific number of weeks (ten) and the mother take an equal amount. The parents may divide the 
rest of the paid leave period as they choose.58 The official purpose of the “paternal quota” is “to 
encourage fathers to participate more in caring for their infant.”59 So deep-seated is the commitment to 
gender equality that Norway even has a gender-conscious kindergarten plan. Indeed, under the state 
“Framework Plan for the Content and Tasks of Kindergartens,” consciousness-raising begins at a young 
age: “The activities in the kindergartens must be based on the principle of gender equality. Boys and 
girls must have equal opportunities to be seen and heard, and encouraged to join in together in all the 
activities that go on in the kindergarten.”60  
(ii) Director support and a narrative of change  
On balance, a strong majority (almost three-quarters) of corporate directors in the sample 
indicated their own personal support for the law. This includes almost all female respondents and half of 
the males.61 A minority either opposed the law or indicated a willingness to tolerate or accept it, or did 
not express a clear position. The majority of directors in support of the law spoke to how their views had 
evolved, presenting a robust narrative of change. Almost two-thirds of proponents reported that they 
were initially opposed, hesitant, or agnostic about quotas. It was only after seeing the quota law in 
action and directly experiencing its effects that they eventually came to endorse it.62 These results 
resonate with the conclusions of the preliminary, survey-based study that Groysberg and Bell 
conducted, which found that “contrary to popular belief . . . men in countries with quotas supported 
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them in higher numbers than men in countries without them” and that “[n]early all the female directors 
from countries with quotas agreed they were effective, versus about half of the female directors from 
countries without quotas.”63 The remarks of two female directors are illustrative:  
[I]t’s a really, really difficult question. At first, I thought, ‘What on earth is this? I don’t 
want to be quota-ed into anything! . . . I’m sure you can imagine yourself, it doesn’t feel 
very good that you’re recruited because you have to be recruited. . . . [S]o first I was . . . 
negative. . . .  [But] you have to do something extreme to get a change, like we’ve done 
in Norway. . . . I think in general the people are happy with the quota laws, apart from, . 
. . (mimicking) ‘We don’t like to be regulated.’ . . .  It’s been positive. . . . I support it. . . . 
[I]t’s been good for . . . the way [boards] work. 64 
I’m convinced normally that quotation is not a good idea, and I’m skeptical to most 
kinds of quotations generally. But what I see after this law has been effected, is that 
suddenly there are a lot of clever young women that I didn’t know before. I hadn’t heard 
about them, I didn’t know they existed. . . . [T]here was a tendency to what we call the 
‘man’s club syndrome.’ You know: they ask the men . . . they go out with or have their 
club with. So there was a self-recruiting system in a way, where the old men recruited 
the other old men and suddenly you had the . . . very little group that was on all of the 
boards. . . . [I]t’s been very refreshing to see all these young, clever, competent, strong 
women coming out of nowhere and actually doing a very good job.  . . . I didn’t foresee 
that effect. And that’s why I’ve had to say that I have changed my perspective. I’m much 
more positive to it now.65  
Another respondent remarked that women who were originally opposed to the law were 
“typically women that . . .  had made . . . careers the hard way, . . . climbing the ladders without any 
help, so to speak.” In this (female) interviewee’s opinion, these senior women had initially believed that 
the law would push unqualified females to their level “without having to work for it.” These women, 
however, subsequently changed their minds because of “how successful the quota law’s been and how 
it’s actually been contributing to better quality in . . . the board’s work.”66  
These reflections notwithstanding, a number of participants who endorsed the law also 
expressed reservations, some mild and some strong. In general, when exploring whether they were 
ultimately in favor of the law, most of the responses reflected a kind of internal monologue or struggle; 
even if a director supported or opposed the quota overall, he or she still recognized negative or positive 
aspects to it. As one female director commented: “I’m not completely comfortable with it still. It still irks 
me. But I see . . . what’s happened and I think it’s very good, the result.”67 Interestingly, this internal 
struggle sometimes appeared to cause respondents to question their own deeply held beliefs. In one 
case, for example, a female director made it clear that she loathes governmental meddling in the private 
sphere. Additionally, she expressed her disagreement with those who would suggest that board 
membership is a “female . . . right.” That said, she ultimately supported the quota law because, in her 
view, it was a necessary evil in disrupting the closed networks that had previously dominated 
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boardrooms. It was almost as if she was grudgingly accepting that the free market principles she held so 
dearly had disappointed her—and that the quota was a necessary correction of market failure.68 
I was particularly interested in exploring whether a tension existed in the views of directors who 
first received ASA board appointments prior to the quota’s implementation (“group one”) and those 
who first received appointments during the transitional or mandatory periods (“group two”). Do the 
men and women who entered the boardroom subsequent to the law have a more positive view of it 
than those who had previously become directors? In analyzing the responses of both comparator 
groups, group two expressed a slightly stronger preference for the law; eight out of ten in group two 
indicated support for the law, whereas six out of nine in group one expressed support. That said, group 
two also expressed stronger reservations. Overall, in considering the totality of responses, there does 
not appear to be any substantial, noteworthy difference. Both the “new directors on the block” and the 
directors who preceded them tend to speak favorably about the forced inclusion of gender diversity. 
When asked if they would recommend quotas to other countries currently considering 
regulatory possibilities to address board homogeneity, most directors (almost two-thirds) responded 
affirmatively. Naturally, some of these respondents qualified their answer by adding that their 
recommendation would be conditional on the presence of certain integral factors, such as the existence 
of a sufficient pool of qualified, educated female candidates (harkening back to the socio-political and 
cultural factors discussed above). Following from this, I asked interviewees about various possibilities for 
the drafting and implementation of the quota law. Should the law have been crafted or operationalized 
in a different way? While most were satisfied with the status quo, a significant minority discussed 
alternatives, either because of dissatisfaction with the existing law or simply as hypothetical possibilities. 
The most common alternatives they proposed included: (1) reducing the harshness of the penalty for 
noncompliance by using fines, rather than dissolution; (2) providing companies with more time to reach 
compliance; and (3) using a more gradual quota system with initial targets lower than 40 percent, with a 
view towards eventually reaching 40 percent over a number of years. 
B. The quota law’s meaning and effects  
 To the extent that directors in the sample changed their minds about the quota law, such that it 
now enjoys support,69 the natural question is ‘why?’ At the time of the interviews, the law had been 
compulsory for more than three years. Did witnessing the law in operation cause a general shift in 
opinion? Overall, interviewees provided a range of reasons for their endorsement of the law, including 
that it has harnessed the entire talent or resource pool available in society; that it has been efficient, in 
that it has increased the levels of female representation on boards in a short amount of time; and that it 
has promoted equal opportunities for men and women.  
Throughout the interviews, often without regard to the particular question asked, respondents 
emphasized that the law had simply worked—it had achieved positive results. But what precisely were 
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those results? A dominant narrative among participants, both male and female, was that gender 
diversity has a positive effect on the process and substance of board decision making and the board’s 
overall governance culture.  
The gender-related benefits that respondents perceived can be broken down into the categories 
of characteristics and outcomes. Characteristics are traits or differences that female directors are 
thought to possess or bring to their board work. In identifying these attributes, some interviewees 
initially expressed trepidation about gender stereotyping, but they then explicitly drew the connection 
between gender and particular valuable attributes. Outcomes, on the other hand, are changes gender 
diversity brings to the way members of the board work or to the way the board operates as a whole. 
These changes could either appear as a direct result of increased heterogeneity or as the combined 
effect of the various gender-specific characteristics identified. Not every response fit neatly into one of 
these two categories, and a number of responses overlapped. Further, a small minority felt that the 
overall perceived positive effects of gender diversity manifest either in specific situations only or when 
combined with other factors, such as age. Nonetheless, these categorizations describe the overarching 
impressions of the sample population.  
(i) Characteristics  
 The positive gender-specific “characteristics” that respondents identified fell into four 
subcategories: (1) intellectual and experiential diversity; (2) diligence; (3) outsider status/independence; 
and (4) style of engagement. Of these, the first three arose most frequently in the data; the fourth was 
noteworthy, but less prominent.  
First, participants offered a compelling account of female directors’ intellectual and experiential 
diversity. Most felt that women bring to the boardroom, and to the decision making that occurs therein, 
a different set—or broader range—of perspectives, experiences, angles, and viewpoints than their male 
counterparts. As I discuss in more detail in the next section, interviewees believed a range of effects 
flowed from the presence of this cognitive difference. Most typically, respondents said that diverse 
perspectives and ideas provide a broader basis for decision making. Others felt that the presence of 
varying perspectives contributes to long-term, stable value creation and preservation or the overall 
long-term survival of the company.  
With respect to why female directors in particular bring intellectual and experiential diversity to 
the boardroom, most felt that there was something specifically related to gender at play. Women 
directors either have uniquely “female perspectives” or have developed different perspectives from 
men due to different life experiences or different employment and experiential backgrounds. One 
female director emphasized that the value-added of this dynamic results from the balance achieved by 
mixing the experiences and perspectives of women with that of men. After describing her most recent 
CEO position as involving “a board of well, mostly men, all thinking with their calculators,” and noting 
the benefits of the viewpoint range women bring, she observed:  
[B]elieve me, . . . I know generalizations are wrong. . . .  [B]ut . . . I think a board without 
men, generally, would mean the company didn’t get anywhere. . . . Because they are 
risk-seeking, they are out there, they are doing it, they don’t have [the] second thoughts 
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that women tend to have. But if you balance these perspectives, you get better 
decisions.70 
Second, respondents presented a vivid narrative of diligence. Most frequently, they observed 
that female directors are more likely than their male counterparts to probe deeply into the issue at 
hand. They accomplish this via the assertive presentation of inquiries. Women, it was felt, ask more 
questions, more challenging questions, more interesting and counter-intuitive questions, or even so-
called “stupid” questions.71 Mirroring the findings of qualitative studies on US and Canadian boards, 
interviewees suggested that males “are more afraid to show that they might not know everything. . . . 
[T]o show that they’re not experts on everything.”72 This particular female director observed that 
sometimes when women become inquisitive, “the men look very relieved, . . . [because] they didn’t 
know [the answer] either.”73 Another male director stated: “[I]f you have a board with five people like 
me. They’re all . . . from the same school, of the same age, they have the same background, they have 
been studying finance. . . . [W]e tend to ask questions and we want to spend time on items we have a lot 
of knowledge [on]. . . . If you have different experiences and a more diversified board, you will have 
different questions asked.”74  
Interviewees offered a range of responses when pressed as to why female directors probe more. 
Some observed that women directors tend to be younger and in earlier stages of their career, or are 
lacking in industry experience more generally. Interestingly though, only a few respondents offered this 
view. More frequently, participants tended to attribute the inquisitiveness to the possibility that women 
are uninterested in presenting a façade of knowledge and are loath to make decisions they do not fully 
understand or take material components of a decision for granted.  
Also on the theme of diligence, and consonant with the findings of previous qualitative studies,75 
others pointed out that female directors are more prepared for board meetings (e.g., they read 
documents more thoroughly), insist on more information prior to making a decision in order to anchor 
that decision (e.g., they tend to seek more fulsome documentation), and are otherwise more 
conscientious generally (e.g., they are more responsible and reliable, are willing to put in more effort 
when required, and take their work more seriously). 
Third, interviewees frequently portrayed female candidates as outsiders, or as existing separate 
and apart from prevailing male-dominated board structures. Throughout the conversations, in addition 
to using the outsider motif, respondents also utilized the related discourse of independence. Participants 
emphasized that the law has severed or broken up close ties amongst directors, or between directors 
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and other company players, such as the CEO and senior management generally. While some espoused 
the virtues of independence at a general level, indicating that it is essential to good governance, many 
others took this a step further by specifically linking independence with the idea of women as 
“outsiders.” These interviewees suggested that female candidates often come from “non-traditional” 
networks that tend not to overlap with those of men. Correspondingly, one female director described 
the recruitment of female candidates as selecting “someone out of the inner circle,” “out of their inner 
sphere,” or from “a little bit further away.”76  
How did participants explain this outsider status? It stems largely from not being in the same 
social networks as men and from standing on the periphery of specific sets of male relationships, such as 
those based on sporting activities. Interviewees commented, for example, that men are part of “the 
same golf club”77 or “golf clubs,”78 and generally are part of a “man culture” in which men have “things 
they are doing together where no woman is involved,” such as “rotary” clubs, “hunting and fishing” and 
“football games.”79 Further, interviewees used terms denoting the tight-knit nature of these male 
relationships and their inextricable social element, referring to some male boards as a “gang of 
friends,”80 an “inner circle,”81 an “old boys’ network,”82 and “a bunch of . . . buddies” or a “bunch of 
friends” who “go out to have beers together every Friday.”83 One interviewee remarked on the pattern 
of “friends recruiting friends into the boardrooms.”84 Another noted that the business world, specifically 
the C-suite, is still mostly “a male community” whose social network is informal in that it is “like the boys 
go out and have a beer.”85  
Fourth, some participants observed that female directors tend to have a different style of 
engagement. Their approach to leadership and decision making was thought to be more relational and 
to promote a dynamic of participation and collaboration on the board.86 They are more likely to elicit 
the opinions of others and to try to ensure that everyone in the boardroom takes part in the discussion. 
It was evident that some female directors consciously viewed this approach as a means of more 
effective communication. One, for example, indicated that a relational method gets her “opinion across 
in a better way” and that she is “maybe . . . heard better.”87 Another suggested that employing such a 
method in discussing possible alternative solutions or decisions “get[s] the other[s] on the board to 
actually think more and to weight other possible solutions as well.”88 This participant contrasted such 
behavior with what she perceived as a male tendency to “jump to conclusions” without necessarily 
examining all implications or possible alternatives.89 A third described the gendered dynamic of 
                                                          
76
 Interviewee 17, Transcript, at 10, 9, 7. 
77
 Interviewee 23, Transcript, at 6. 
78
 Interviewee 14, Transcript, at 8. 
79
 Interviewee 6, Transcript, at 9. 
80
 Interviewee 17, Transcript, at 7. 
81
 Ibid at 10. 
82
 Interviewee 2, Transcript, at 13. 
83
 Interviewee 3, Transcript, at 24, 7. 
84
 Interviewee 16, Transcript, at 8. 
85
 Interviewee 17, Transcript, at 8. 
86
 This echoes the findings of studies on US boards. See Kramer, Konrad & Erkut, supra note 72 at iv (“We find that 
women . . . bring a collaborative leadership style that benefits boardroom dynamics by increasing the amount of 
listening, social support, and win-win problem-solving.”). 
87
 Interviewee 7, Transcript, at 10. 
88
 Interviewee 8, Transcript, at 7. 
89
 Ibid. 
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, 




participative decision making in the following way, simultaneously querying aloud whether the 
perceived difference is best attributable to biology, cultural socialization, or both: 
[I]t is my personal observation that men and women interact differently in the 
boardroom. . . . [A] male [decision-making] round would be like the men are confirming 
each other like a football team. . . . [T]he spokesman . . . utters an opinion . . . in a 
matter, and the next man will simply confirm him. . . . [T]he decision . . . has been 
understood and sometimes even communicated before the board meeting. So it’s only a 
confirmation taking place in the boardroom. Whereas women . . . will come to the board 
and be more interested in having a real work session where everybody utters their 
opinion, you agree on something in the meeting. . . . I’m not saying that one culture or 
working procedure is better than the other. They’re just different.90 
 (ii) Outcomes  
In this section, I discuss what my data show are some of the consequences of gender-based 
heterogeneity for boardroom work and dynamics. Throughout the interviews, respondents linked some 
or all of the qualities identified above with seven potential outcomes: (1) enhanced dialogue; (2) better 
decision making; (3) more effective risk mitigation and crisis management; (4) higher-quality monitoring 
of, and guidance to, management; (5) positive changes to the boardroom environment or culture; (6) 
more orderly and systematic board work; and (7) positive changes in the behavior of men. Respondents 
most commonly cited outcomes one through five, but also identified outcomes six and seven with some 
frequency. 
 
Of course, directors appointed after the quota law came into effect cannot meaningfully 
compare current boardroom dynamics with those in place prior to the law’s enactment. Their limited 
vantage point must therefore be taken into account when putting the data in perspective. Mindful of 
this limitation, it was especially important to include in the sample directors who had attained their 
initial ASA appointments prequota. As discussed above, almost 40 percent of the interviewees fell into 
that category. As with the question of whether directors supported the quota law, I sought to learn 
whether directors who had served on ASA boards before the quota came in effect (“group one”) viewed 
the consequences of the law differently from those whose initial entry into the ASA boardroom came 
during the transitional or mandatory period (“group two”). Once again, there was little tangible 
difference between the “new directors on the block” and the directors who preceded them. Seven out 
of ten in group two believed that increased diversification had had a positive impact on board decision 
making, governance, or culture, whereas seven out of nine held that view in group one. 
 
  I turn now to the outcomes highlighted above. First, many respondents contended that gender 
diversity promotes enhanced dialogue. Interviewees frequently spoke of their belief that heterogeneity 
has resulted in: (1) higher quality boardroom discussions; (2) broader discussions that consider a wider 
range of angles or viewpoints; (3) deeper or more thorough discussions; (4) more frequent and lengthier 
discussions; (5) better-informed discussions; (6) discussions that are more frequently brought inside the 
boardroom (as opposed to being held in spaces outside the boardroom, either exclusively or in addition 
to inside the boardroom); or (7) discussions in which items that directors previously took for granted are 
drawn out and addressed—where the implicit becomes explicit.91  
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  Second, and intimately related, many interviewees indicated that diversification has led to (or 
has the potential to lead to) better decision making processes and/or final decisions. Here, respondents 
focused on the enhanced quality of the procedure and the resulting outcome. Even when a diverse 
board’s ultimate decision was not substantively different than one that a purely or predominantly male 
board would take, respondents suggested that a diverse board would nonetheless engage in higher-
caliber decision making, more thoroughly canvass the decision’s implications, and act on a more 
informed basis with better information, thus improving the decision’s implementation. One female 
director illustrated these sentiments with the following remarks: 
 [T]here are more discussions. . . . [T]he women are the skunks. . . . They ask the difficult 
questions, . . . they want to examine an issue from all angles or more angles. . . .  [T]here 
is less risk involved in the decisions [because] you have explored different aspects. . . .  
[T]hey [women directors] are very conscientious, they prepare, they really want to . . . 
do a good job. . . . [O]ften in boards, with the old boys' network  . . .  I say, “I’m sure 
you’ve discussed this a lot of times before, but” . . . and I ask the question. And I see 
them looking at each other. And you can see they’ve never discussed it!92  
Third, interviewees frequently suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that the presence of women in 
the boardroom informs risk mitigation or adds particular value during situations of crisis. On the first 
front, a number indicated that boards with gender diversity tend to be more risk averse or consider risk-
based implications more often or seriously. Some of these respondents explicitly attributed this to the 
view that female directors tend to be more cautious or risk averse than males. Amongst these directors, 
it was thought that female directors foresee and wish to address future problems sooner than their 
male counterparts. Some framed this as thinking of “worst-case scenario[s],”93 while others framed it as 
female directors trying to prevent future problems, such as preventing lawsuits or trying to reach 
decisions that will prove useful not just in the moment but also a “few years down the road.”94  
As with intellectual diversity, some took care to highlight the need to establish an equilibrium 
between the “male” risk-welcoming behavior and “female” risk aversion that my interviewees 
portrayed. On the second front, some participants highlighted female directors’ particular role and value 
in making especially difficult and/or controversial decisions when the firm was in a state of crisis. One 
female director was of the view that there is actually very little that distinguishes male and female 
behavior during routine board work. However, she poignantly spoke about how, in her view, this 
changed during moments of crisis or emergency:  
I feel in a couple of situations that were very, very critical, then I saw [the] difference 
between how men and women behave. . . . I’ve seen situations where the women were 
more willing to dig into the difficult questions and to really go to the bottom even if it 
was extremely painful both for the rest of the board, but . . . mostly for the CEO. . . . 
[T]he really difficult situations, [where] you think that the CEO has . . . done something 
criminal . . . [o]r you think that he has done something negligent, something that makes 
it such that you . . . are unsure whether he’s the suitable person to be in the driving 
seat.95 
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  Fourth, many respondents drew a connection between gender-diverse boards and increased or 
higher-quality monitoring of management and guidance provided to management. These directors felt 
that heterogeneous boards tend to challenge management more, or to impede patterns of “groupthink” 
(the tendency of persons in closely bonded groups to pursue consensus without critical evaluation and 
without considering different possibilities),96 which, in turn, increases the probability of critically 
engaging management. One female director, after positing that women are more likely to question 
management and to be independent, discussed the pernicious effects of groupthink on board work, 
stating that “men are more . . . afraid of exposing one another.” She attributed this to elements of what 
she described as “man culture”: 
I think there’s a man culture, in some way. . . . [I]f you go back in time, they have these 
things they are doing together where no women are involved. They have this rotary, 
they have . . . [these] clubs or organizations where . . . there are only men.  . . .  And they 
have this hunting and fishing thing, and they have [these] football games, and . . . I think 
they are . . . more afraid of exposing one another. 97 
Some participants in this group also suggested that female directors request more updates from 
management or CEOs and devote more attention to monitoring the implementation of strategy and its 
progress. That said, as noted, responses falling into this group did not pertain exclusively to monitoring, 
but also extended to the board’s role in counselling and assisting management. Participants spoke of the 
connections between diversity and the ability to “guide management.”98 As one female director stated:  
I try to support management. I feel a lot of times most board members in general are 
much more concerned about finding some fault in the materials, fault in their 
arguments . . . and try to control and regulate . . . what the . . . [management] is doing. . 
. . I’m more concerned with trying to support management and trying to encourage 
them, trying to help them be motivated. . . . And I think that . . . has to do with me being 
a woman.99  
Fifth, interviewees often offered the view that diversification had changed the overall 
boardroom environment or culture. Most frequently, this meant that the atmosphere around the board 
table was more open, less severe, and one in which directors felt comfortable or “safe” contributing to 
board discussions and asking questions.100 This includes increased tolerance of varying opinions. Some 
respondents also mentioned a more fun working atmosphere—that increased diversity has changed the 
tone of board work, making it a more enjoyable, collegial experience, or that it has added a positive 
energy to the work conducted. One director described this as a transformation to an “open-minded 
board” that “opens up for everybody, regardless of woman or man.”101 
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 Sixth, a number of participants suggested that diversified boards lead to more professional work 
cultures and to more systematized board work.102 The nexus between gender representation and a shift 
to more structured, systemic processes was thought to manifest itself in a number of ways, including: 
establishing or improving formal protocols, procedures and systems; clearly defining the scope or 
mission of the board; ensuring that the board remains on task and follows existing rules and procedures; 
ensuring that management prepares for board meetings and provides board members with relevant 
information and an agenda; mandating formal meetings for certain tasks; making board meetings more 
structured; requiring more information and documents; and ensuring that meetings are run properly. 
Interviewees did not think the implications of such systemization were merely academic. One 
interviewee, for example, drew on the case of a company that found itself on the front page of the 
newspaper in a pollution-related whistleblowing situation. The firm “found out the hard way that [it] 
didn’t have a whistleblower . . . procedure in place.”103 Linking this to the theme of risk discussed above, 
she indicated that this kind of exposure would not have occurred with a gender-diverse board—that 
“women on boards make sure that all these kinds of procedures are there.”104 
Finally, some participants suggested that increased gender diversity on boards had induced 
changes in the behavior of male directors or of management when interacting with the board. Some 
participants, for example, opined that the tendency of female directors to be better prepared has 
induced better preparation in their male colleagues or has led to an improvement in, as one male 
director put it, “the normal male habits,” such that board work has become more systematic and 
disciplined.105 Consistent with research findings in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, some also 
observed a shift in tone, as male directors were thought to act in a less macho, stereotypically male 
fashion.106  
 As respondents’ representations reveal, the characteristics of female board members I 
described in the previous section have informed these outcomes to varying degrees. Of these 
characteristics, outsider status was a particularly powerful factor, informing outcomes such as: 
enhanced dialogue and decision making; monitoring and guiding management; risk reduction; crisis 
management; and systematization of board work. Especially important for respondents was their 
perception that outsider status breaks up close ties—what one male director even characterized as 
“collusion.”107 This dynamic of severing social bonds purportedly occurred on two levels: first amongst 
directors, and second between directors and the CEO or high-level management more generally. 
Amongst directors, women’s outsider status led to more robust intraboard deliberations and to the 
posing of probing questions that might embarrass or challenge other board members—questions that 
intragroup members (male directors) would not necessarily pose to each other. Outsider status also led 
to the provision of higher quality advice to CEOs and senior management and to more effective 
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monitoring more generally; directors were more likely to voice important dissenting opinions and, at 
times, make difficult and unpleasant decisions such as firing the CEO.108   
 
(iii) Concrete examples of diversity’s value 
 The results described above resonate with those in the excellent study Broome, Conley, and 
Krawiec conducted regarding the views of US corporate directors on board diversity.109 The authors also 
found that public company directors typically grounded their enthusiasm for heterogeneity in the idea 
of viewpoint plurality and its production of more fruitful deliberations.110 They refer to this view as the 
“Bakke narrative,”111 invoking the 1978 US Supreme Court decision concerning university affirmative 
action. While the Court in that case declared the quota-based measures of UC–Davis medical school 
unconstitutional, Justice Powell in his plurality opinion concluded that race could be a factor in making 
admissions decisions in order to promote diversity. He wrote of the benefits of exposure to “the ideas 
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples” and noted that medical students from 
diverse backgrounds “may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas 
that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding 
their vital service to humanity.”112  
  My findings differ in an important respect from theirs, however. Broome, Conley, and Krawiec 
observed that their sample provided “distinct echoes of Bakke,”113 but concluded that the narrative is 
only “a theoretical narrative without concrete detail, a story without substance.”114 While espousing the 
benefits of diversity at a surface level, when they pressed US directors in their sample for meaningful, 
tangible examples, the directors provided none.115 This absence of particulars led the authors to pose 
the question: “Why do our subjects, on the one hand, affirm board diversity as a goal while, on the 
other, they offer little substantive justification for pursuing it?”116 The authors speculate as to the cause, 
advancing the following possibility: 
Perhaps the Bakke narrative has achieved a broad but shallow victory, a discourse-level 
hegemony that has few consequences for thought or action. . . . [G]enuflecting in the 
direction of diversity has become a routine part of polite and politically correct 
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discourse. This has correlated with a modest increase in women and minorities on 
boards, though their representation may have reached a plateau. But, to judge by our 
sample, business people do not seem to be thinking very hard about the concept of 
diversity, and so have not come up with a coherent narrative about why it is 
important.117 
My analysis of the data thus far suggests that participants in my study of Norway displayed a 
very deep appreciation of diversity’s tangible value. A majority of my respondents, however, went even 
further still, supporting their general observations of diversity’s importance with concrete examples 
based on either first-hand experience or second-hand knowledge (from their impressions of other 
boards or impressions they gained from directors at other firms and contacts). Most of these directors 
did so immediately, in direct response to my questions. Others did so organically at other points during 
the interview, without prompting. One interviewee needed time to let the issue marinate, before 
revisiting it on his own in a different context and providing an answer.  
Many who furnished concrete examples cited a prominent Norwegian company that had been 
embroiled in a serious corruption scandal and noted the specific role that the firm’s female directors 
played in addressing the controversy. One female respondent described the case succinctly: 
[T]op management had paid bribes to get contracts. . . . But the board didn’t really want 
to address it. . . . There were three independent female board members in that board. . . 
. And they demanded . . . transparency and action. And it resulted in the CEO leaving the 
company. . . . This would not have happened if they hadn’t been on the board. These 
were strong, well-known female directors. . . . So that’s one example.118  
For these participants, this firm’s experience represented an affirmative case of gender diversity’s 
positive effect on governance.119  
  Others in the sample provided examples unrelated to corruption. One (female) interviewee 
described her own careful, cautious approach to expansion during a bullish period for her company, 
immediately preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the momentum toward growth in the 
boardroom, this director remained “very firm” in her apprehensions, on account of her concerns that 
the board’s assumptions about continuing revenues might be flawed. As a result of this director’s 
insistence and foresight regarding this risk, the company chose not to expand and, after the downturn, it 
continued to do well while many of its competitors did not survive. When pressed further, this 
respondent specifically attributed the quality of risk-consciousness to gender. Based on her experience, 
she offered the view that women tend to be more “cautious” and to consider the “worst-case scenario,” 
whereas men do not.120 Another (male) respondent recounted his experience on the board of a 
company that had accidentally caused environmental damage. In his view, the female members of the 
board put forth “several perspectives” in response to the crisis, thereby “broadening the scope” of views 
presented in the discussions. For this director, this situation was a “good example” of how women have 
added particular value to boardroom deliberations by increasing the range of perspectives considered, a 
benefit that he said is strongest for “issues . . . which can be controversial.”121 
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A third (female) director chronicled her board service in the banking industry and noted the 
effects gender had on product marketing strategies: “I’ve noticed that there are totally different things 
we focus on compared to the men. . . . [H]alf of the customers in the large banks are women but they 
tend to have the marketing campaigns as if only men were among the customers.”122 In her view, 
women directors have “had a great influence” on this dynamic, resulting in “a new way of thinking 
around the customers.”123 She stressed that marketing campaigns with which she was familiar were 
“affected by the fact that we were females” and that this change “happened several times . . . in more 
than one company.”124 As she put it, “we have another, different everyday life, which gives us some 
angles that the men do not have.”125 In a similar vein, a fourth (female) director recollected her role in 
correcting a firm’s sexist online advertising. In doing so, she also attributed her reaction and proactivity 
to her gender: 
I had noticed that this company had these internet pages with lightly-dressed women, 
to put it that way. . . .  And I brought that up in the board. I said, “Hey, you guys . . . I 
really think it’s the absolutely wrong thing to do, and it pulls the attention away from 
the real story . . . .”  . . . [A]nd they changed the practice. . . . [S]o that’s a very concrete 
example. . . . I asked, “Why is it like this?” and . . . a man might not have reacted and he 
would definitely not have brought it up as a problem. But I brought it up and they 
changed the practice.126 
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to confidently account for the difference in the abilities of 
US and Norwegian directors to point to precise examples of gender diversity’s effects on board work. It 
could be that there is no discernable reason informing this discrepancy. It could be that Norwegian 
corporate governance culture vests more power and authority in the board such that directors generally 
have a greater impact on the operations of the corporation. Or, it could be that because the 
representation of women on US public company boards is generally low, especially compared to quota-
bound Norwegian firms, there simply are not enough women to demonstrate an impact on governance. 
These questions should inform future comparative research investigations. 
(iv) The benefits of critical mass  
 A notable feature of Norway’s law is its requirement that public companies comply with varying 
degrees of gender representation depending on the size of their boards. As noted in chapter 3, if, for 
example, a board has nine directors overall, there must be at least four men and four women. If a board 
is larger than nine, both genders must constitute 40 percent of the total makeup, at a minimum. In 
smaller boards with four or five directors, there must be at least two men and two women.127 The 
requirement of gender balance thus ensures that women constitute a critical mass on corporate boards. 
I therefore sought to learn whether the experiences of the directors I interviewed shed any light on the 
value of having certain levels of female representation. 
Critical mass theory, most notably advanced in Kanter’s landmark work on gender and 
organizational cultures in 1970s corporate America, highlights the dynamics created by the presence of 
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different proportions of different social groups relative to one another in different settings.128 
Individuals who are present in only scarce numbers take on “token” status, while those who are 
numerous achieve “numerical dominance.”129 For the former group, difficulties abound, such as 
alienation and being cast as a representative for all in their group, and the possibilities for success are 
much more limited.130 That said, “[a]s proportions begin to shift, so do social experiences.”131  
The consequences for individual members of groups that have not achieved critical mass can be 
significant and troubling. Outgroup members can experience profound isolation and feel pressure to 
adopt the dominant group’s perceived characteristics. In a UK study, for example, female directors and 
high-level managers working in male-dominated firm cultures have reported that they frequently felt 
lonely and excluded, and that their male colleagues were unwilling to take steps toward shaping a more 
inclusive, equitable atmosphere. Some reported that they were put into traps, subjected to sexual 
harassment, or intentionally deprived of support from male colleagues to evaluate whether they could 
cope. They faced a typical catch-22 of power dynamics: how to exercise power constructively, while 
ensuring that male directors and managers were not made to feel threatened and vulnerable in a way 
that would adversely impact the women’s careers.132  
This dilemma caused women to experience an internal struggle in which they weighed the 
political consequences of being too forthright. In navigating this tension, the women went through a 
self-transformation process that gradually made them “tougher” as a means of self-preservation, 
though some characterized this transformation as regrettable.133 In Canada, women directors have also 
reported this sort of self-transformation, or shifting of behaviors to conform to stereotypically male 
norms.134 Further, female directors of Financial Post 500 companies have recounted experiences of 
social alienation that resulted in feelings of desolation and in reduced access to networks that would 
provide key professional relationships and information. Surveyed board members have expressed the 
feeling that male directors view them as mere tokens and, correspondingly, that they must “over-
perform” in order to gain legitimacy.135 In the United States, a survey of female inside directors of 
Fortune 1000 companies reveals that particular business cultures entrench exclusionary processes that 
marginalize and disempower women and thwart their full engagement.136 For the women studied, such 
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processes included being shut out of significant meetings with clients and being micromanaged by the 
CEO while conducting performance assessments of lower-level colleagues.137 
As others note, Kanter’s original research focused on the relationship between low levels of 
representation and trying work environments; it did not assert that more balanced levels would yield 
different organizational outcomes.138 Subsequent studies utilizing the critical mass framework, however, 
do make this claim,139 suggesting that outlier groups will exert tangible influence only after achieving a 
certain degree of representation. When this occurs, their views and abilities may become more 
entrenched in the organization’s deliberative processes—for example, as the individuals become more 
socially integrated and are thus increasingly relied upon.140   
Thus, contemporary studies applying critical mass theory suggest that the “numbers game” can 
be an important factor in alleviating negative experiences and in facilitating women’s and other groups’ 
more robust and influential participation. In one empirical study of US boardrooms, the authors 
concluded that “having three or more women on a board can create a tipping point where women are 
no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of board discussions more 
substantially, with positive effects on corporate governance.”141 An investigation of Israeli companies 
found higher levels of engagement by both male and female board members “when a critical mass of 
three women directors is in attendance.”142  
The merits of critical mass theory are vigorously debated in various social contexts.143 In 
Broome, Conley, and Krawiec’s study, the authors “found only limited evidence that a critical mass of 
women affected board behavior in any substantive way,” except when it came to industrial relations–
related issues.144 In my study, after discussing the potential relationship between gender diversity and 
board decision making and governance, I asked participants whether, in their view, critical mass is a 
factor in realizing any diversity-related benefits. Overall, the majority of the sample indicated that 
critical mass was indeed a salient factor.145 This includes a small number of responses where the 
participant observed this to be the case, but suggested that some additional, accompanying quality was 
also necessary, namely that the women constituting the critical mass be actively engaged. Further, of 
those who responded positively, most felt that either two or two or more women were necessary to 




 Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M Conley & Kimberly D Krawiec, “Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the 




 Quinetta M Roberson & Hyeon Jeong Park, “Examining the Link Between Diversity and Firm Performance: The 
Effects of Diversity Reputation and Leader Racial Diversity” (2007) 32:5 Group & Org Mgmt 548 at 563-64. 
141
 Kramer, Konrad & Erkut, supra note 72 at 53. Also in the US context, see Heather Foust-Cummings, “Women on 
Corporate Boards of Directors: Best Practice Companies” in Vinnicombe et al, supra note 49, 210 at 214-15. For a 
study finding a positive association between critical mass and performance in German companies, see Jasmin 
Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Karin Vetter, “Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly 
Constitutes a ‘Critical Mass?’” (2013) 118:1 J Bus Ethics 61.  
142
 Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, “Does the Gender of Directors Matter?” (2 December 2013) at 38, online: SSRN  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868033>.    
143
 See Broome, Conley & Krawiec, “Does Critical Mass Matter?”, supra note 138 at 1053-54 (surveying the 
literature).  
144
 Ibid at 1060. 
145
 For a prior survey-based study of critical mass and Norwegian boards, related to innovation, see Mariateresa 
Torchia, Andrea Calabrò & Morten Huse, “Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical Mass” 
(2011) 102:2 J Bus Ethics 299.  
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, 




establish a critical mass.146 The following comments of a female director were particularly instructive in 
linking the quota law’s required level of gender balance with the benefits of critical mass: 
I think forty [percent] is perfect. . . . And the reason why I say that is that my experience 
is that when you’re the single one being a female on those boards, you’re more [likely 
to] adopt to the way the board has always done or performed their meetings, . . . 
everything is like before, you more easily adopt to the culture already there. . . . But 
when it’s 40 percent, you actually make a change.147  
In some cases, my critical mass–related exchanges with female participants led to discussions of 
whether the presence of more women on the board had made a difference to the interviewee at a 
personal level. This catalyzed some poignant reflections on the experience of navigating traditionally 
male-dominated environments. One respondent offered these thoughts: 
 
 I’ve been the only woman in very, very many situations, as I was early put into 
managerial positions. . . . So I’ve been used to being alone, so to speak. And I can deal 
with that, but it becomes lonely to be the only woman in a male setting. . . . [I]t’s not a 
desirable position, really. And even if you disagree with other women, it just feels 
better. It gives a feeling of comfort and ease and you don’t need to feel that [you must] 
be on your toes . . .  you know, say the right things or not say the right things, and that 
[that] may be . . . used against you because you’re a woman. 148  
 
This general theme of being a sole female director, or the sole female in other similar leadership 
contexts such as government or senior management, came up frequently during the interviews and is 
noted in social psychological literature to have negative effects on performance outcomes.149 Not 
surprisingly, the majority of respondents who broached this topic described the experience with 
reference to feelings of marginalization, expressing, for example, that: “it’s hard to be the single 
skunk”;150 it’s “lonely” to be the only woman;151 one feels “more at ease” when one is “not the only 
woman”;152 and that “[i]t’s tough to be a loner” and it is “a little bit easier, even if you’re high on 
courage,” to have another woman on the board.153  
 
Even the minority of female directors who indicated that being the lone woman was not a 
problem for them personally nonetheless conceded that it was “better,”154 “important,”155 “very 
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nice,”156 or “quite nice”157 to have more than one woman on the board. Some male directors were also 
sympathetic, offering that “[i]t would be a disadvantage for one woman to come in as  . . .  the first 
woman ever on that board and to be alone” because “she might find herself up against the old boys’ 
network,”158 and that “it could be very tough to be the only” woman on a board.159 I followed up with a 
number of the female interviewees who indicated a preference for the presence of other women 
around the boardroom table and asked whether this preference was dependant on the other female(s) 
agreeing with them or sharing the same opinion. All directors who were asked this question answered 
that their preference for, or the benefits of, gender diversity on boards did not depend on the other 
female director(s) expressing concurrence with a substantive opinion. These results appear to be 
consistent with the “stereotype inoculation model” found in Dasgupta’s social psychology work, 
suggesting that the presence of “ingroup members . . . in high-achievement settings . . . function as 
‘social vaccines’ who inoculate and strengthen fellow group members’ self-concept.”160 
 
(v) Compromised efficiency? 
 The majority of my sample indicated that gender diversity has a positive effect on decision 
making and governance, which manifests itself through, for example, deeper probing into issues facing 
the firm, asking more challenging questions of management and of other board members, and 
producing more robust dialogue. But are there potential negative effects of diversity on the deliberative 
process? Prior research in fields such as organizational behavior and finance, for example, suggests that 
cognitive heterogeneity and the resulting give and take of differing positions can lead to increased social 
discordance161 and may compromise the efficiency of decision making.162  
I delved more deeply into the potentially Janus-faced nature of gender-diverse boards, focusing 
on the possibility that the advantageous aspects of heterogeneity the sample perceived may actually 
have had the unintended result of slowing down decision making or making  consensus more difficult to 
achieve.163 On this issue, while the ability to reach consensus did not appear to be a major hurdle, most 
participants conceded that gender-mixed boards can take more time to do so. My respondents did not, 
however, view this negatively. Of the directors who made this concession, the majority simultaneously 
indicated that any efficiency loss was nonetheless beneficial for their boards given the higher quality of 
the resulting decision. As one male director noted, “I think that’s valuable. If you reach consensus in a 
few seconds, there hasn’t been any discussion. . . . You haven’t learned anything from that 
discussion.”164 The rhetorical questions of a female director echoed this sentiment: “[W]hat’s the 
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success of a board meeting? Is it that it closes at a scheduled time? Or is it that you made a good 
decision?”165 
Interestingly, another male director, while acknowledging the possibility of an increase in 
deliberation time, placed the onus for any such increase and the resulting inefficiencies squarely on the 
shoulders of management. In his view, women in the boardroom are asking more questions, probing 
deeper, and requesting more documentation. But any inefficiency lies in the fact that management is 
sometimes unprepared to meet these (reasonable) demands:  
Interviewer: Does it take longer then, to achieve consensus? 
 
Respondent: That would, I think, depend on how good the management of the 
companies are in providing the necessary documentation . . . as part of the presentation 
of the various issues. I think . . . if they are good at that, it doesn’t necessarily . . . require 
more discussions or longer discussions. [So], I think I would say no. . . . [I]f [a decision] 
goes over more board meetings, it’s not gender that causes that.166 
This director, however, added that management is slowly “getting used to being better prepared” and 
drew an unambiguous connection between gender diversity and board monitoring: “[M]anagement is 
sort of getting to grips with the fact that young, well-educated women [are] coming on the board[s] 
[and] are asking for more information. . . . So I think, as far as improving quality of documentation for 
board decisions, I think that there’s been an improvement and I believe that is coming from gender.”167 
(vi) Opening networks, redistributing power 
 Much of the narrative data I presented above center on the effects of gender-balanced 
corporate boards, as achieved through Norway’s quota regime. They paint a portrait of the ways in 
which legally mandated diversification has affected boardroom cultural dynamics, decision making, and 
overall governance. The portrait consists of numerous, interrelated positive impacts. But the quota law 
has also arguably had broader social effects by redistributing power in Norwegian society. That 
important power dynamics are at stake is reflected in the fact that many firms did not comply when the 
quota was voluntary.  
Female interviewees noted that some male directors were loath to “give away . . . power”168 by 
surrendering their “privileged . . . leadership positions”169 to women and that males’ positions on boards 
“were threatened” as a result of the quota law.170 One remarked that some male directors’ negative 
reaction to the quota law was based on the reluctance to “giv[e] up something” and having to witness 
that thing “going to young women instead of [to] themselves.”171 One male interviewee echoed these 
observations, discussing how male directors recognize the contribution of female directors to 
governance, “but not necessarily . . . [at] the expense of their own participation.”172 Further, some 
directors felt that low levels of female representation in certain industries are rooted in the male power 
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that would be lost in these particularly lucrative fields. One respondent, in discussing the extractive and 
financial sectors, remarked that these industries are home to “the really, really hard cash” and thus 
represent “the last border [that] will break.” In her view, men working in these areas are especially likely 
to perceive women as “taking positions” and “claiming some of [their] power” and that “the higher the 
stakes . . . the harder it is to get in!”173  
 
 At an operational level, the mandatory quota served to redistribute these positions of power in 
several ways. As I touched on above, when noting the attributes of independence and outsider status 
that women bring to the boardroom, many respondents discussed how the quota compelled boards and 
nominating committees to extend their searches for new directors beyond the usual, traditional spheres 
of comfort. Boards had no choice but to look outside of their existing networks and to search beyond 
candidates with CEO and C-suite experience or directly related industry experience. In the words of the 
interviewees, firms “have been forced to look in a . . . broader environment than . . . they traditionally 
do.”174 The quota law “demands a wider search,”175 which means engaging networks that firms are 
perhaps “not used to deal[ing] with”176 and expanding their “one-dimensional picture of what [a] board 
member should be,”177 instead of preserving the usual dynamic of “friends recruiting friends into the 
boardrooms.”178 Firms are now considering a “whole different corner than they ever did before” and 
opening up a “whole new set of . . .  relationships.”179 In doing so, they have “expand[ed] the 
recruitment base” and effectively “doubl[ed] . . . the talent pool they are picking from.”180  
 
 In supporting the mandatory quota, some respondents indicated that, without it, recruitment 
based on personal ties and similar backgrounds or characteristics would continue. These responses, 
along with the redistribution effects my interviewees noted, highlight the salience of implicit cognitive 
bias and closed social networks in blocking gender diversity, as I discussed in chapter 2. One director 
specifically cited this theme as a reason for endorsing quotas over disclosure strategies, opining that 
disclosure is too weak a measure to effectively break the pattern of in-group favoritism in recruitment: 
“[I]t’s too tempting to . . . give [a board position] to someone that understands you, that will not 
necessarily ask those difficult questions; someone that . . . is a little bit similar to you, and that you get 
an advantage from [by] putting there.”181  
This theme emerged prominently in the interviews. A significant degree of the support for the 
quota law ultimately stemmed from the view that the law was necessary to diversify boards in a 
meaningful way—an outcome most respondents supported. In perhaps one of the most telling set of 
exchanges during my field work, I asked sample members if, in their view, the current levels of gender 
representation achieved under the quota law would remain intact if the state were to rescind the law. 
Only a thin minority felt that they would, while over two-thirds of the sample believed that the levels, 
overall, would decrease. Interviewees did not agree on the timing or magnitude of this hypothetical 
change. Some opined that the drop would be gradual, while others suspected that it would be 
instantaneous. Some predicted the decrease would be slight, while others thought it would be 
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significant. One participant said a decrease would occur in particular companies only. Despite this 
disagreement, however, one thing was clear: The most frequently cited factor in explaining why the 
levels would decrease was that of network-based barriers and in-group favoritism. One interviewee, for 
example, stated that “it’s easier, more comfortable” and “quicker” for firms to pick a man for a board 
position.182 Another felt that owners can more easily relate to a person who “seems to have basically the 
same values or competence . . . and he’s been doing something which is similar” and stated that “the 
network is still . . . heavily tilted male.”183  
 The redistribution effect raises the question of whether affected directors might have mixed 
feelings about the law even if they see its benefits for boardroom operations. Even if diversification has 
positive effects on company governance, the question remains: Why are quotas an appropriate 
mechanism by which to achieve those benefits, especially given the intense controversy surrounding 
them? Put another way, even if participants have provided a convincing narrative of governance 
heterogeneity, why do they support (even if hesitantly) positive discrimination as a means of achieving 
it? For one male director, the various benefits he associated with diversification still did not justify the 
quota: 
Interviewer:  So we’ve had a really good discussion about both the positives and the 
negatives. . . . [O]verall, do you support the use of quotas for increasing gender diversity 
on boards?  
Respondent:  No . . . but that’s more . . . a philosophical and political way of 
reasoning. Because . . . I’m of the general opinion that you can’t introduce a legal 
framework for everything you want to achieve in the society.  
. . .   
Interviewer:  What’s been achieved so far, all of the benefits that we’ve just talked 
about, do you think they would have happened without the legal framework?  
Respondent:  No. No. No.  
Interviewer:  (laughing) So can you help me reconcile those two statements?184  
This director, however, was in the minority. Most respondents thought that the quota law proved 
justified because of its efficiency in increasing levels of female representation on boards in a short 
period of time, and many additionally supported it because its mandate served the important objective 
of utilizing the entire talent pool available in Norwegian society. Again, some interviewees further noted 
that Norwegian firms did not heed the call to increase gender diversity (at least at any significant level) 
during the voluntary period; compliance had to be mandated.  
(vii) The absence of stigma  
In chapter 3, I noted that one of the major critiques of quotas is that they may stigmatize their 
beneficiaries. In the United Kingdom, for example, a recent House of Lords committee report 
recommended against pursuing quotas as a line of first resort  because, among other things, the 
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committee felt that positive discrimination “would risk fostering the perception—though entirely 
incorrect—that women on boards were not there by merit.”185 The committee reached this view after 
hearing conflicting evidence from witnesses. Some opined that quota-based measures are “patronizing 
or tokenistic, and risk . . . undermining the perception of women in senior positions.”186 Others, 
however, expressed the view that, “rather than being patronizing . . . quotas provided the means to 
overcome structural inequalities in the labour market”187 and that “it was not . . . in the least patronising 
to take effective steps to address the current bias in favour of men.”188 Similarly, in Canada, a leading 
voice of institutional investors conjectured in a brief submitted to a Senate committee that “[q]uotas 
can result in unintended consequences, not the least of which is the potential stigmatization of the 
female candidates they are designed to promote.”189 This refrain has been echoed in various settings, 
including in a policy submission by a consortium of corporations to the Ontario Securities Commission 
(regarding the regulator’s proposed disclosure model),190 an influential report by one of Canada’s largest 
banks (which also described quotas as “the antithesis of merit”),191 and the Canadian press.192 
Mindful of the frequent speculation in policy conversations that quota-based regimes may have 
a stigmatizing, isolating, and/or patronizing effect—a possibility many use to advocate against quotas—I 
asked participants questions designed to learn: (a) whether the beneficiaries of positive discrimination 
have been stigmatized or treated differently from male directors; and (b) whether those who serve on 
boards alongside these beneficiaries perceive them to be stigmatized in some way. What has it meant 
for women to “invade” the traditionally male space of corporate governance? After relative numerical 
parity was achieved, what were the consequences for intraboard power arrangements?  
 
Some participants observed that critics of Norway’s quota law predicted that it would stigmatize 
beneficiaries, mirroring international policy dialogues. One director confessed that the possibility of this 
sort of toxic repercussion was one of the reasons why she initially opposed the law. While she now 
supports the law (with reservations), she also reported having experienced stigmatizing treatment, 
especially from the press: “[T]hey tend to say, (mimicking) ‘Oh well, you just got this [position], of 
course, because of the quotation law.’”193 Another female director recounted the following story about 
a female colleague’s entry to the board of another firm: 
 
Respondent:  I’ll tell you one story. There’s a female lawyer . . . specializing in 
shipping. She’s really very good. And . . . she came into this new shipping company 
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board. And the chairman looked at her . . . and then he said, (mimicking) ‘Oh, and then I 
see we have  . . . Pippi Longstocking on the board.’ . . .  Now her hair is red and . . . you 
know, it was like, she . . . [says,] (mimicking) ‘Fuck you.’ – Sorry.  
 
Interviewer:  No, . . . it’s okay. 
 
Respondent:  . . . [S]he’s a tough woman, but really, you know, it was not a good start. 
. . . And he may not have meant it very badly, but, you know . . .194  
 
Overall, however, only a small minority felt that these sorts of effects had actually come to pass 
and were a salient issue, or at least speculated that stigma had resulted. And even amongst this 
minority, not all respondents would characterize the differential treatment as occurring along gendered 
lines. One participant, for example, felt that any newcomer to an organization will be subjected to 
enhanced scrutiny and to the expectation that he or she “earn [his/her] spurs.”195 Contrary to critics’ 
initial predictions, the majority of the sample (slightly more than 85 percent): (a) did not observe 
stigmatizing or isolating effects or differential treatment; (b) observed such effects, but in only a very 
limited number of cases; (c) observed such effects, but did not think them salient or felt that they could 
be managed; or (d) observed such effects, but for only a limited period of time, immediately after the 
quota law was passed. This suggests that the benefits of the quota law have outweighed any 
stigmatizing costs, to the extent that these costs have materialized.  
 
Interestingly, one male respondent suggested a gendered dimension to the stigmatization 
argument itself. In his view, men strategically employ it to thwart women’s progress, leading him to 
characterize it as “a hopeless . . . male argument.”196 Another male respondent expressed the view that 
the quota law had “normalized” gender diversity on boards such that it is now viewed as a “quality 
stamp” of firms and part of how “a proper company should function.”197 This interviewee suggested that 
the risk of stigmatization was a live issue only in the period immediately following the quota’s 
implementation, but not after it became internalized:  
 
[I]n the first year of the quota law, definitely it was looked upon . . . in a [certain] way 
and I also think that even very qualified female members hesitated to take on board 
positions because they were afraid of being stigmatized. But that has definitely changed. 
. . . [Now] I think you’ll find that [women] are just as qualified, if not better, than most of 
their male colleagues, actually.198 
 
 Given that respondents had offered vivid accounts of insular recruitment processes and 
masculinist boardroom dynamics that predated the quota, one might think that women would 
encounter resistance and stigma after taking their seats at the table. And yet, comments such as these 
were not atypical: “I think that [stigmatization] was predicted, but I don’t think it has happened. I truly 
believe that all board members are perceived and treated as professionals.”199 Perhaps the expressions 
of sexism were reserved for outside the boardroom, in separate social spaces? Perhaps these 
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expressions took the form of everyday microaggressions that were less conspicuous and in some cases 
were not registered or taken seriously if they arose from ignorance or lacked malevolent intent? My 
respondents suggested different explanations. Some, for example, explained the absence of stigma as a 
function of critical mass. By mandating gender balance and foreclosing any possibility of tokenism, the 
quota law made marginalization difficult, if not impossible. As one female participant remarked: 
 
When you first enter that room, you’re treated as a board member, regardless of how 
you entered the room. . . . At least that’s my experience. . . . And all the other females 
I’ve talked to say exactly the same thing. Because when you’re representing 40 percent 
in there, you can’t stigmatize 40 percent of the board. . . . [Y]ou could have stigmatized 
one person, or 15 percent. . . . But you can’t stigmatize 40 percent.200  
 It is clear that female directors in the sample generally did not speak about the quota law in a 
manner suggesting that it has had stigmatizing effects.201 The majority of female participants reported 
that they felt comfortable on the boards on which they sat, identified and discussed what they 
perceived to be their main contributions to their boards, and confirmed the feeling that their boards 
recognized or appreciated their contributions. These results are consistent with the conclusions of 
previous survey-based studies on Norwegian female directors. Elstad and Ladegard, for example, found 
that women directors “perceive contributions of high levels of . . . influence and information sharing . . . 
and low levels of . . . self-censorship,” results that “are not in accordance with the predictions of 
tokenism theory, but are more aligned with critical mass arguments.”202 Mathisen, Ogaard, and 
Marnburg further found evidence “that female directors are welcomed into boardrooms, not perceived 
as out-groups, and [boards] are able to benefit from the female directors’ experience and skills.”203  
Rather than employing a discourse of stigma or tokenism, the majority of my sample 
characterized the quota as a vehicle that—in their lives—has facilitated access to the upper echelons of 
the corporation. These interviewees used various terms to describe this facilitation. One remarked that, 
post quota, she has been approached more frequently to join public company boards and that she is 
“sure it helped [her] to get into the . . . set of candidates” being considered.204 Others described how the 
law has “opened a fabulous opportunity”205 or has constituted “a huge opportunity.”206  
Other interviewees were even more explicit. One commented, “I have no doubt that I would not 
have had those [board] positions without the quota law . . . and that has been . . . understood. Not 
directly communicated, but sort of understood. . . . And, frankly, I don’t mind.”207 Similarly, another 
discussed how she had not held a board position until the quota law passed, and thus admitted that she 
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got an “opportunity because of the law,”208 given that she did not think she “would have been on the 
boards if it hadn’t been for this quota law.”209 I should note that both of these women were 
unquestionably well qualified—one was a law firm partner with an impressive business law practice, and 
the other had extensive prequota industry management experience. Interestingly, another participant 
noted that the quota law afforded her access to a board of a company in a traditionally male-dominated 
industry: “[T]he maritime construction firm, I would have never ever entered into that industry or . . . 
been deemed suitable for . . . the board [of] such an industry, without the quota law.”210 Another 
remarked that a particular board “probably wouldn’t have even known about” her if not for the 
quota.211 This M.B.A. graduate had reached the partnership level at her firm and possessed managerial, 
consulting, and financial analyst experience. 
Conclusion   
  
 Overall, the dynamics brought to light in these interviews suggest that Norway’s quota law, as 
an instrument of economic governance, has had a profound effect on Norwegian companies. It has 
affected the social fabric and decision making culture of the boardroom, transformed overall firm 
governance, and shifted the landscape of existing gender-related power arrangements. That said, the 
lived reality of the quota law also gives rise to a number of interesting and difficult questions for future 
research and of particular relevance to other countries contemplating the adoption of a quota regime. 
These questions include: whether quota laws essentialize gender; whether the benefits of outsider 
status will disappear as women gradually assimilate onto boards and into the networks of male 
directors; whether quotas have a negative relationship with firm financial performance; whether 
boardroom diversity will enhance diversity in the management suite; whether quota regimes can be 
successful in countries with socio-political cultures that are different from that of Norway; whether the 
benefits of diversity are tied to particular features of corporate governance cultures; and whether 
publicly traded firms will attempt to avoid quota requirements by becoming private. I turn to these 
questions and the surrounding issues in chapter 5. 
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